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1. Introduction
Income inequality has grown in English-speaking economies in recent decades, largely due to 
growing wage inequality (Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2011). A variety of explanations have 
been proffered, including increasing returns to skill induced by skills-biased technological 
change (SBTC) (Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2008), changes in labour market institutions, most 
notably de-unionisation (Dustmann et al., 2009; Card, Lemieux and Riddell, 2004) and 
increased trade (Autor et al., 2013).  In their seminal paper for the United States Lemieux, 
MacLeod and Parent (LMP) (2009) show that performance pay (PP) accounted for one-fifth 
of the growth in wage inequality among men between the late 1970s and early 1990s, and 
most of the growth in wage inequality among high earners in the top quintile. They show 
that PP became more widespread between the 1970s and early 1990s, was closely tied to 
individuals' productive characteristics, and that the returns to these characteristics were rising 
faster in PP jobs than in fixed wage jobs.  Their findings are consistent with a world in which 
SBTC increases the rewards for more productive workers and induces firms to resort to PP 
to both attract and incentivise those workers.   
LMP's (2009) model, which draws on the work of Lazear (1986; 2000) and Prendergast 
(1999), indicates PP generates higher wage dispersion than fixed rate pay (FP) due to the 
sorting of high ability workers into PP jobs - a labour market segmentation type argument - 
and because PP reflects individuals' marginal product more accurately than fixed wage 
schedules. Growth in PP jobs allows high ability workers to recoup returns to their ability in 
a way that is not possible with fixed wages, while the higher incidence of PP at the top end 
of the earnings distribution will also generate higher wage dispersion. 
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LMP attribute the increased use of PP to SBTC and the declining costs of worker 
monitoring due to advances in technology.  These trends are likely to have continued in the 
period since the mid-1990s which LMP were studying, both in the United States and in other 
industrialised countries. For instance, Sommerfeld (2013) documents an almost continuous 
rise in the share of PP jobs between 1984 and 2009.  
And yet LMP's findings have recently been challenged in a series of papers using data for the 
United States.  Using establishment data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Employer 
Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC) series (which derives from the National 
Compensation Survey) Gittleman and Pierce (2013) show the proportion of jobs with PP 
rose in the 1990s, only to fall in the 2000s such that, by 2013, it had declined by about one-
fifth since LMP's study period, irrespective of how one measures PP. This decline is 
apparent throughout the wage distribution but is concentrated among low earners. 
Furthermore, in a second paper, Gittleman and Pierce (2015) show the contribution of PP to 
growth in the earnings distribution in the first decade of the 21st Century has been small - in 
the order of 9 per cent of the growth in variance. Sommerfeld’s analysis for Germany also 
showed that despite the expansion of PP, it did not lead to increased wage inequality because 
it was associated with higher wages across the board and not just for high earners.  
Two more papers find LMP's basic results do not hold for some parts of the working 
population.  Like LMP, Heywood and Parent (2012) analyse the Panel Survey of Income 
Dynamics (PSID). They find that, during the period 1976-1998, the tendency for PP to be 
associated with greater wage inequality at the top of the male earnings distribution applies to 
white workers but not to black workers. In a second paper using the National Longitudinal 
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Survey of Youth (NLSY), Heywood and Parent (2013) find skilled fathers select into PP 
jobs, whereas skilled mothers select out of PP jobs, a finding which is not consistent with 
standard assumptions regarding workers sorting into PP jobs on ability. This, in turn, raises 
questions about the effects of PP on wage inequality. 
 
In Britain wage inequality among full-time workers has been rising since the late 1970s, 
although the rate of change slowed dramatically in the 2000s, with all the growth being 
confined to the top part of the wage distribution (Machin, 2011; Lindley and Machin, 2013). 
Over the whole period the graduate wage premium rose, despite growth in the graduate 
share in employment and hours, suggesting demand for highly skilled labour was exceeding 
its supply (Lindley and Machin, op. cit.).  This is consistent with SBTC, and the authors find 
direct evidence of greater demand for more educated workers in more technologically 
advanced industries (op. cit.: 175-176).  They also point to the introduction of the national 
minimum wage in 1999 and its subsequent up-rating as a reason for the stability in the 50-10 
wage differential in the 2000s.   
 
Although they point to the potential importance of SBTC in the British context, Lindley and 
Machin do not consider the potential role played by PP in growing wage inequality.  There is 
some evidence that annual bonuses have contributed to an increase in wage inequality at the 
top of the earnings distribution in the last decade or so, primarily as a result of large bonus 
receipt by bankers, traders and other well-paid professionals in the Finance sector (Bell and 
Van Reenen, 2010, 2013).1 These employees may be sharing in the substantial rents 
1 However, bonuses account for only a small proportion of total earnings for those outside the top decile of 
earners (Bell and Van Reenen: 2013, 10-11).  
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generated by a lack of competition in the sector.  Alternatively, they may be benefiting from 
productivity "scaling" effects that accrue to highly productive employees when changes such 
as increased firm size and capital intensification "scale up" worker productivity, increasing 
returns to their employer. This is the type of effect identified by Gabaix and Landier (2008) 
and Kaplan (2012) in relation to "superstars" such as CEOs.  
 
But, aside from the effects of bonus payments at the very top, what effects has PP had on 
the overall wage distribution in Britain? Two studies using cross-sectional linked employer-
employee data come to different conclusions. Manning and Saidi (2011) show that, although 
there is a wage premium attached to the receipt of PP, it had a negligible effect on wage 
dispersion in 2004. However, using data from the 2011 Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey Bryson et al. (2014) find PP results in a sizeable widening in wage differentials relative 
to a counterfactual wage distribution, and that this effect is larger higher up the earnings 
distribution. The premium rises markedly as one moves up the hourly wage distribution: it is 
seven times higher at the 90th percentile than it is at the 10th percentile in the wage 
distribution (.42 log points compared to .06 log points). This, coupled with the higher 
incidence of PP among those with wage-enhancing attributes, means PP contributes 
substantially to higher wage dispersion in Britain. However its overall effect on the wage 
distribution is less marked than it might have been due to the relatively low proportion of 
employees on PP contracts in Britain.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, in light of the debate in 
the US about the changing role of PP, we track the incidence of PP using the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the period 1998-2008 that immediately preceded the 
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recession. We consider alternative broad and narrow definitions of PP and estimate their 
individual, job and workplace correlates. Next we estimate the premium associated with PP 
jobs and look at how it changed over the decade. Finally we estimate the effects of PP on 
wage dispersion and changes in the wage distribution over the period, accounting for the 
changing PP premium as well as changes in the prevalence of PP at different parts of the 
distribution. 
 
We find no indication that PP jobs (broadly or narrowly defined) are becoming increasingly 
prevalent. Depending on the measure used and splitting by gender, we find either gradual 
declines or broad stability, although PP jobs may have picked up slightly among full-time 
women in the two years before the recession. Nonetheless the returns to PP remain positive, 
even when controlling for unobserved personal characteristics, and in fact seem to have 
increased over the period. Confirming other recent studies, we show that wage inequality 
grew somewhat during the decade of economic growth that ended abruptly with the 
recession, largely due to growing earnings dispersion in the top half of the wage distribution 
(with some reduction in inequality at the bottom for women). Estimates of PP effects on the 
counterfactual wage distribution confirm PP increased earnings dispersion among men and 
women, including the sub-group of full-time working women. PP also appears to have 
contributed to reduced wage dispersion at the bottom among women. In both cases, the 
changes are largest for the broad measure of PP, which includes bonuses. Nevertheless the 
effects overall are reasonably modest – while overall PP remains a disequalising force on the 
wage distribution in Britain, the fact that it has not become more widespread has limited its 
impact on wage inequality. 
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In the next section we outline the theoretical links between wage dispersion and PP. Section 
Three then introduces the data, followed by section Four which presents results relating to 
the incidence and correlates of PP followed by its links to wages and wage dispersion in 
Britain. Finally section Five discusses the implications of the findings and draws some 
conclusions. 
 
2. Wage Dispersion and Performance Pay 
In perfectly competitive labour markets in which firms and workers have perfect 
information employees would be paid their marginal product, that is, they would be paid for 
their performance. However, employers and employees often prefer fixed wage contracts 
based on time rather than effort or output. Employers may find fixed wages less costly to 
administer, especially if labour inputs or outputs are costly to monitor: it can be costly for 
firms to identify the contribution of individual employees to output, while factors beyond 
the control of the employee, and even the firm, mean output is affected by factors other than 
employees' talent and effort.  In standard economic theory wage dispersion rises when 
employees are paid for their performance, compared to a counterfactual scenario in which 
they are paid a fixed wage.  Under fixed wage schedules employees are paid for time worked, 
whereas under PP they are paid for output. Heterogeneity in individuals' ability to increase 
output, either by virtue of talent or effort, is ignored in fixed wage schedules, but it does 
have a bearing on earnings when pay is linked to performance.  
 
There are three channels that may lead to higher earnings dispersion in the presence of PP. 
The first is a mechanical effect: PP reveals underlying differences in individuals’ productivity 
that were previously ignored. Second, PP may have the effect of incentivising effort: 
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employees can raise (lower) their earnings through higher (lower) effort such that variance in 
effort induces variance in earnings, whereas employees' earnings are not a function of effort 
in fixed wage jobs. Third, employees will sort into (out of) PP jobs according to talent and 
other traits (such as their tastes for effort and risk) that may affect their earnings. If more 
able workers sort into PP jobs where they can command higher earnings, while less able 
workers prefer the guarantee of a fixed wage, the market will segment into high and low 
earners along PP lines.  Thus via all three of these channels, the introduction of PP should 
lead to greater wage dispersion than might obtain if all workers were paid a fixed wage.2  
 
Of course this is an over-simplistic picture because job retention and job progression are 
often performance-related, even when workers are paid a fixed wage, because wage levels 
and earnings progression reflect workers' efforts and talent, while career concerns can 
incentivise effort (Prendergast, 1999; Papps et al., 2011).  But the link between performance 
and pay is usually more explicit and more direct in the presence of PP schemes. 
 
While all these considerations suggest that PP will be associated with greater wage dispersion 
in cross section, the impact of PP on changes in wage dispersion are less clear. LMP (2009: 
3-4) discuss some reasons why PP may induce growth in earnings dispersion. If demands for 
more skilled and more able workers are rising due to SBTC or globalisation, this will raise 
the market value of more talented workers such that firms may bid up their price relative to 
less talented workers as they try to influence the job matching process. This, in turn, may 
induce greater worker sorting between PP and FP jobs, contributing to growth in the 
2 If there is strong sorting on ability into (out of) the PP sector, there may be greater homogeneity among 
the workers in the PP sector than in the fixed wage sector which may result in wage dispersion within the 
PP sector being lower than dispersion in the fixed wage sector. 
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dispersion of earnings between PP and fixed pay jobs. If there is an increase in the 
prevalence of PP, particularly at the top end of the earnings distribution, this will also 
contribute to a growth in earnings dispersion. 
 
3. Data  
We analyse data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which began in 1991 
with a sample of some 5,000 households from England, Scotland and Wales. Household 
members aged 16 or over were interviewed annually (usually in September or October) 
through to the final year 2008. The sample consists of the original “Essex sample” of 
households together with associated new entrants to the survey (e.g. children reaching age 16 
and new partners of original sample members), thus keeping it broadly be representative of 
the British population structure.3   
 
The analyses focus on employees aged 18-64 years, excluding those reporting total weekly 
hours of 100 or more or 5 or less. This restriction, which affects fewer than 2% of 
observations, reduces possible measurement error in hourly wages arising from extreme 
reports of hours worked.  It also eliminates very small jobs. To account for the possibility of 
different wage determination processes across gender, we perform separate analyses for men 
and women. We also analyse a sample of women in full-time jobs only to make sure that any 
gender differences do not reflect the much larger proportion of women in part-time jobs 
(where PP is less common). All our estimates are weighted using the cross-sectional weights 
3 Given the rules for new entrants to the survey, it will not reflect the impact of immigration in the mid-
2000s. In addition, we do not include the Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland extension samples added in 
1999 and 2001, as this would introduce a discontinuity in the data. 
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provided with the survey, which account for survey design and the likelihood that a 
respondent appears in a particular wave. 
 
As is standard in the literature our wages measure is hourly wages, which we compute as 
(usual gross pay/(usual basic hours+1.5 X usual paid overtime). The usual gross pay variable 
includes regular bonuses, commission and tips, so the hourly wage measure will take account 
of these components of PP. We can also construct a second hourly pay measure including 
more irregular bonuses (such as seasonal bonuses), derived from a separate question in the 
survey. While in principal this second measure better reflects total bonus payments received, 
it carries a risk of double counting if respondents report some bonus payments in answer to 
both questions (the second question does not explicitly exclude all regular bonuses). As a 
result we use the first wage measure as our baseline dependent variable, but as a robustness 
check we also run all analyses with the wage measure including irregular bonuses (the results 
are almost identical). 
 
BHPS contains two measures of PP.  The first, relating to bonuses,  is derived from the 
question: "In the last 12 months have you received any bonuses such as a Christmas 
or quarterly bonus, profit-related pay or profit-sharing bonus, or an occasional 
commission?". The second measure relates specifically to performance-related pay (PRP). 
Respondents are asked: "Does your pay include performance related pay?"    The bonus 
question was asked in Waves 6-18 and the PRP question in Waves 8-18. As we wish to 
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combine information from the two measures we focus on Waves 8-18 covering the period 
1998-2008. 4 
 
Gittleman and Pierce (2013) emphasise the importance of recognising that PP measures 
often capture different types of PP, some more closely related to individual productivity than 
others. In our data, the PRP question arguably captures pay linked to individual 
performance, while the bonus question captures payments like Christmas bonuses and 
rewards, such as profit related pay, that are probably linked to team or firm performance. 
Across the pooled sample PRP is roughly half as prevalent as bonus receipt (15% compared 
to 32%, see Table 1). 
 






No Yes Total 
Bonus No 90.8 9.2 100.0 
 
 
73.2 41.2 68.3 
 Yes 71.7 28.3 100.0 
 
 
26.8 58.8 31.7 
 Total 84.8 15.3 100.0 
 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
While the two measures are positively correlated, over 70% of those receiving bonuses do 
not get PRP and 41% of those receiving PRP do not get bonuses (Table 2). So to some 
extent PRP and bonus receipt are distinct types of compensation. As we show later it is also 
the case that employees in PRP and bonus jobs differ somewhat in their characteristics. 
4 A different question about bonuses was asked in Waves 1-5: "Does your pay ever include incentive 
bonuses or profit related pay?"  It includes fewer bonus components than the later question and about 10% 
fewer people reported bonuses each year by this measure. As we wish to use consistent measures for each 
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No Yes Total 
 No 62.0 6.3 68.3 
Bonus Yes 22.7 9.0 31.7 
 Total 84.8 15.3 100.0 
 
Gittleman and Pierce (2012) present two PP measures: a broad measure  including incentive 
pay and all bonuses; and a narrow PP measure restricted to incentive pay and performance-based 
bonuses only. We follow their approach. Our broad measure of PP combines the PRP and 
bonus questions, while our narrow measure is confined to the PRP measure. Table 2 shows 
that 62% of employees did not get either PRP or bonus, thus the prevalence of PP broadly 
measured is 38%, whereas 15% receive PP narrowly defined. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 above relate to the receipt of PP. However, throughout the analysis presented 
in Section Four we follow other papers in the literature by focusing on PP jobs, not receipt.  
A job is a period of employment with the same employer in the same “grade”, i.e. if they get 
promoted it is a new job. A job is classified as a PP job where the respondent has been in 
receipt of PP on at least one occasion.  This adjustment is made in recognition of that fact 
that some jobs are PP jobs but that, for whatever reason (poor performance on the part of 
the firm or individual, for instance) there has been no receipt of PP in a particular year - that 
is to say, the respondent may be in a job that pays for performance but, in a given year, the 
PP due is £0, thus making it hard to distinguish from a fixed pay job.   
 
year, and also combine the bonus and PRP measures for some of the analysis, we do not use the earlier 
bonus question. 
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Since the probability of a PP job paying out for performance is partly a function of the 
number of times that job is observed in the data (which is lower for jobs near the ends of the 
data window) it is necessary to make an “endpoint adjustment” which accounts for the 
presence of jobs of different durations. Following LMP’s approach we construct an adjusted 
measure of the prevalence of PP jobs by estimating probit models for the probability of 
appearing in each wave of the data based on the number of times a job is observed. The 
resulting predicted probabilities are used to construct a weight which then effectively holds 
the distribution of the number of times a job is observed to that observed in the middle of 
our sample.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 The Prevalence of PP and Its Correlates 










1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Year
All men All women
FT women
Prevalence of performance pay jobs (broad)
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Figures 1a shows the incidence of PP jobs using the broad measure (PRP plus bonuses). It is 
apparent that men are more likely to be in PP jobs than women and that, among women, PP 
jobs are more common in full-time jobs.  Throughout the period a little under two-thirds of 
jobs undertaken by men were PP jobs.  Among women, the figure is closer to one-half.  The 
incidence of PP jobs declines a little over the decade before the recession began, the drop 
being particularly notable among full-time women. There is no evidence at all that PP jobs 
became more common except perhaps a small rebound among women towards the end of 
the period.  
 









1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Year
All men All women
FT women




Figure 1b presents the same information but this time for the narrow measure of PP which 
is based solely on the performance-related pay question referred to in Section Three.  The 
male-female gap is smaller on this narrow measure, and it narrows over the period since 
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1998 because the percentage of jobs undertaken by men that are PP jobs has been falling. 
The percentage of PP jobs among women was broadly stable, though as for the broad 
measure, there is some indication that it may have increased slightly after 2006. Overall, 
though, we see no clear evidence that PP jobs expanded over this period.  
 
Table 3 shows a bivariate probit estimated for the pooled sample which establishes the 
correlates of bonus-paying jobs and PRP jobs, having accounted for the positive and 
statistically significant correlation in unobservables between the two.  There are a number of 
points worth noting. First, consistent with the graphical evidence, the incidence of both 
bonus jobs and PRP jobs has declined significantly since the turn of the century having 
conditioned on employees' demographic, job and workplace characteristics. For PRP jobs 
there was an abrupt decline in 2000 followed by further decline after 2006.  Bonus jobs also 
fell sharply in 2000 but then declined more steadily.  Second, those in receipt of both types 
of PP have higher gross hourly earnings than those in fixed pay jobs: even after accounting 
for occupation, tenure, and other characteristics that influence wages (such as firm size) 
those in PP jobs have gross hourly wages that are around one-third higher than those among 
observationally equivalent fixed pay employees.  
 
Third, the male-female differential in PP jobs, apparent in the figures above, is not 
significant having accounted for other factors. PP jobs are more likely to be full-time, 
permanent, and in managerial, clerical and sales occupations. PRP jobs are more likely to be 
unionised than fixed wage jobs, but this is not the case for bonus jobs. The quadratic in years 
of job tenure turns at about 18 years for bonus jobs and 15 years for PRP jobs, both of 
which are above the 90th percentile of the job tenure distribution, so the probability of 
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bonuses increases in tenure for most employees. Unsurprisingly both types of PP job are 
more likely in larger organizations and the industry patterns are as found in the literature. 
 
Table 3 – Correlates of bonus and PRP jobs 
 
Bonus job PRP job 
Wald test of 
equal effects 
Female                         -0.031 0.022  
Age/10 0.208** 0.106  
(Age/10)2 -0.029** -0.023*  
Married               -0.028 0.016  
Log (gross hourly wage)        0.331** 0.359**  
Part-time (<=30 hours total)   -0.145** -0.266** ** 
Seasonal or temporary job      -0.765** -0.525** ** 
Fixed term job                 -0.624** -0.596**  
Job tenure 0.109** 0.061** ** 
Job tenure squared -0.003** -0.002** ** 
TU or staff assoc at workplace 0.019 0.234** ** 
Public sector   -0.507** -0.064 ** 
Manager 0.139** 0.151*  
Professional -0.069 0.152* ** 
Technician -0.030 0.025  
Clerical 0.111 0.070  
Craft -0.051 0.049  
Personal -0.195** -0.14  
Sales 0.281** 0.425**  
Operative -0.099 -0.057  
Routine 0 0  
Agriculture -0.385** -0.297*  
Mining & utilities -0.03 0.329** * 
Construction -0.215** -0.190**  
Retail and hotels              -0.027 -0.055  
Communications 0.158** 0.041  
Finance and property           -0.001 0.168** ** 
Other industries               -0.275** -0.080 ** 
Social work & health -0.851** -0.741**  
Education -0.891** -0.243** ** 
Public administration -0.685** -0.111 ** 
Manufacturing 0 0  
Establishment 500+ employees                          0.152** 0.197**  
Establishment 50-499 employees                          0.070** 0.099**  
Establishment 1-49 employees                                                   0 0  
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1999              -0.073** 0.02 ** 
2000              -0.156** -0.067** ** 
2001              -0.152** -0.073** ** 
2002              -0.168** -0.089** ** 
2003              -0.177** -0.083** ** 
2004              -0.226** -0.106** ** 
2005              -0.264** -0.095** ** 
2006              -0.309** -0.130** ** 
2007              -0.344** -0.170** ** 
2008              -0.369** -0.192** ** 
Constant                       -0.761** -1.618** ** 
Correlation of equation errors 0.485**  
Log pseudolikelihood -45930.2  
Person-observations                              45743  
Reported estimates are the coefficients from a bivariate probit model. Observations are pooled over waves 8-
18, with standard errors adjusted for clustering within individuals. Estimates are weighted to account for survey 
design and non-response and for the endpoint adjustment. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. 
 
4.2 Is there a Performance Pay Premium? 
Before looking at the growth in wage dispersion in Britain and the role PP may have played 
we run log hourly wage regressions to establish whether there is a PP premium at the mean 
and, if so, how much of it can be explained by the selection of workers into jobs. The results 
are presented in Table 4.  The first column shows the raw wage gap between those in PP 
jobs and those in fixed wage jobs.  The second column is the regression-adjusted gap. The 
third column introduces person fixed effects identified using workers who switch between 
PP and FP jobs.  The top half of the table presents results for the broad PP measure, while 
the bottom half focuses on the narrow PP measure.   
 
Among men, the raw differential is about 25% (= exp(0.221)-1), but falls by around half 
when conditioning on observable differences between PP and FP employees, and to around 
4% controlling for fixed unobservable differences across employees.  The pattern is similar 
whether one uses the broad or narrow measure of PP.  The fact that the premium falls 
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markedly when adjusting for person fixed effects is a clear indication that there is positive 
selection into PP jobs among men. 
 
Table 4 - The PP Wage Premium, 1998-2008 
 Raw Adjusted (OLS) Adjusted (FE) 
Broad PP    
Men  0.221** 0.113** 0.040** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Women  0.134** 0.086** 0.066** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
Women (FT)  0.120** 0.095** 0.060** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) 
Narrow PP  
   Men  0.228** 0.100** 0.044** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) 
Women  0.225** 0.087** 0.057** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) 
Women (FT)  0.194** 0.098** 0.047** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) 
Number of person-observations is 22,108 (men); 23,550 (women); 14,458 (FT women). Regression-adjusted 
estimates also control for quadratics in age and job tenure, and dummies for marital status, part-time work, 
temporary and fixed terms jobs, trade union coverage, public sector status, occupation (9 categories), industry 
(11 categories), establishment size (3 categories), region (13 categories), and wave (8-18). Raw estimates are 
weighted for survey design and non-response. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%.  
 
Turning to women, a similar pattern emerges: there is a sizeable raw wage differential which 
falls when regression-adjusted and falls still further with the introduction of person fixed 
effects.  So, once again, there is clear evidence of positive sorting into PP jobs among 
women.  This is the case among all women and women in full-time jobs.  The premium 
when accounting for fixed unobservable differences across employees is around 6% in most 
cases, so a little higher than for men.5 
5 It is notable that the regression-adjusted premium of around 10% is similar to the estimate Bryson et al. 
(2014) obtain having accounted for workplace fixed effects using the 2011 Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey. 
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To see how the PP premium may have changed over time, Table 5 reports estimates of the 
adjusted premium from the start and end of the time period, pooling observations from 
1998-2000 and from 2006-08 respectively. The OLS estimates increased for all three 
subgroups on both PP measures, and some of the changes were substantial, for instance the 
broad PP premium for men increased from under 8% in 1998-2000 to 13% in 2006-08. The 
FE estimates also increased, albeit by smaller amounts and not for women working full time 
(for them the PP premium, on both measures, fell from 4% in 1998-2000 to an insignificant 
2–3% in 2006-08). But overall there appears to be evidence of an increase in the returns to 
PP over the period. Whether this increase also leads to rising wage inequality will depend on 
where PP workers are in the wage distribution and also on how the decline in the prevalence 
of PP played out across the distribution. In the next section we turn to the net effect of all 
these factors. 
 
Table 5 - The PP Wage Premium, 1998-2000 and 2006-08 compared 
 1998-2000 2006-2008 
 OLS FE OLS FE 
Broad PP     
Men  0.077** 0.049** 0.129** 0.060** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.021) 
Women  0.077** 0.050** 0.090** 0.055** 
 (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) (0.022) 
Women (FT)  0.070** 0.042** 0.101** 0.022 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.014) (0.024) 
Narrow PP  
    Men  0.071** 0.039** 0.098** 0.056** 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.024) 
Women  0.070** 0.065** 0.098** 0.070** 
 (0.011) (0.020) (0.012) (0.027) 
Women (FT)  0.067** 0.040** 0.104** 0.029 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.014) (0.027) 
Number of person-observations in 1998-2000 is 6,598 (men); 6,867 (women); 4,323 (FT women). Number of 
observations in 2006-08 is 5,416 (men); 5,972 (women); 3,611 (FT women). Regression-adjusted estimates also 
control for quadratics in age and job tenure, and dummies for marital status, part-time work, temporary and 
fixed terms jobs, trade union coverage, public sector status, occupation (9 categories), industry (11 categories), 
establishment size (3 categories), region (13 categories), and wave. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%. 
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4.3 Does Performance Pay Affect Wage Dispersion? 
In this section we look at changes in log hourly wage dispersion between 1998-2008 in 
BHPS for men, women, and full-time women.  First we graph dispersion in both tails of the 
wage distribution relative to the median.  To check whether the BHPS results are consistent 
with other sources, we compare them to those elsewhere in the literature which tend to rely 
on the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) and its predecessor the New Earnings 
Survey (NES), in particular Lindley and Machin (L&M) (2013). To ensure we have sufficient 
sample sizes we use two-year moving averages.6 Then we present descriptive information on 
the mean and standard deviation in log hourly earnings for PP jobs and those in FP jobs.  
Finally, we compare the actual wage distribution with a counterfactual wage distribution to 
recover the effect of PP on wages in different parts of the wage distribution.  We will explain 
the methodology behind this below.  
 






















Men's log hourly wages (lower tail)
 
6 This means that, on average, we have around 35-40 unweighted observations in the 1% tails (25 
observations for full-time women). 
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Women's log hourly wages (lower tail)
 
 























FT women's log hourly wages (lower tail)
 
 
Figures 2a-2c shows the log hourly wage distributions for men, women and full-time women 
respectively over the period 1998-2008.   For men we find increasing dispersion at the very 
top of the distribution (the 99-50 differential), but little change further down (the 95-50 and 
90-50 differentials).7 At the bottom we see no real change except in the 50-1 differential 
which fell until 2001-2 then increased sharply. In their analysis L&M find that the 90-50 
differential increased over the period while the 50-10 differential reduced slightly (they do 
not consider the extreme tails). For women, we find increasing dispersion at the top and 
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reducing dispersion at the bottom over 1998-2008, which is similar to the trends reported by 
L&M in the 90-50 and 50-10 differentials.  
 
We therefore see some evidence of a growth in wage dispersion over the period, as do L&M, 
though for men there are some differences as to where precisely in the distribution this 
widening occurred. These differences could relate to sample differences, such as the 
incomplete ASHE coverage of low paid workers or the lack of coverage of new immigrants 
in BHPS, or the fact that very high and very low earners are more difficult to reach with 
household surveys (Bollinger et al., 2014). 
 
How is PP related to wage dispersion over the period? Table 6 shows the mean and variance 
of log hourly wages in the PP and FP sectors for the pooled years.  It is apparent that mean 
wages are higher in the PP sector, in keeping with the wage premium analysis above, but 
there is no evidence to suggest that the variance in wages is greater in the PP sector than the 
FP sector, whether one is looking at men, women or full-time women.  In fact, the variance 
for women is slightly lower in PP than FP jobs (especially by the narrow measure). One 
possible reason for this is that there is greater homogeneity among PP employees than there 
is among FP employees in terms of traits that affect their earnings.  In spite of this finding, 
PP has the potential to affect the earnings distribution owing to the fact that employees 
receive a PP wage premium and, as also seen in Table 3, tend to lie higher in the earnings 
distribution even conditioning on other job characteristics. 
7 Similarly there is no evidence of increasing dispersion towards the middle of the distribution (not 
reported). 
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Table 6 – level and dispersion of log hourly wages by job type, 1998-2008 
 
 Fixed pay Broad PP Narrow PP 
Mean    
Men  2.240 2.465 2.536 
Women  2.089 2.225 2.325 
Women (FT)  2.195 2.317 2.398 
Variance    
Men  0.295 0.309 0.304 
Women  0.299 0.282 0.269 
Women (FT)  0.273 0.261 0.246 
Estimates are pooled over waves 8-18 and weighted for survey design and non-response. 
 
Our estimates of the relationship between PP and the wage distribution are based on a 
reweighting estimator originally deployed by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) and then 
applied in a modified form by LMP (2009).  The method constructs a counterfactual wage 
distribution which proxies the wage distribution that would obtain in the absence of PP in 
the economy. This is achieved by reweighting those sample members who are not in receipt 
of PP such that their observable characteristics closely resemble the overall population of 
workers.  This in turn is achieved by running a probit estimate for the probability of being in 
a PP job and then using the predicted probabilities to reweight the FP employees in such a 
way as to give additional weight to those with high estimated probabilities of being in a PP 
job (because these employees are underrepresented in the FP sample).  One can then recover 
the "effect" of PP at different parts of the wage distribution by comparing the actual 
distribution of wages among all workers to the counterfactual distribution observed among 
the reweighted set of employees not in PP jobs.  
 
Table 7 summarises the results of the counterfactual reweighting exercise for men. We 
consider two points in time, namely early in the period we study (1998-2000) and then again 
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at the end of the period (2006-2008). For each time point, we report various summary 
measures of the actual wage distribution (columns 1 and 4) and the change in the dispersion 
between the two time points (column 7).  The summary measures in column 7 all increased 
between 1998-2000 and 2006-08 (with the exception of a very small fall in the 90-50 
percentile gap), although the increases are generally quite small (consistent with the graphical 
analysis of the actual wage dispersion in Figure 2a), the largest being a 0.05 log point increase 
in the 50-5 percentile gap (column 7).8   
 
In columns 2 and 5 we present the same measures of the respective counterfactual 
distributions. The differences between the two sets of estimates give the PP job effect at 
each time point (columns 3 and 6). Column 8 shows how the PP effect changed over the 
period.  Finally, we calculate the percentage of the change in each measure of wage 
dispersion that can be attributed to PP jobs (column 9): this is simply the ratio of the change 
in the PP effect to the change in the actual wage dispersion. The table includes results for 
both the broad PP measure (top panel) and the narrow measure (bottom panel).9  
 
PP jobs, broadly defined, account for two-thirds (64.3%) of the growth in the variance of log 
hourly wages over the period (row 1). The widening effect of broad PP is apparent 
throughout the wage distribution, but it is a little more pronounced in the upper half of the 
distribution, as is apparent if one compares the magnitude of the numbers in column 8. For 
8 We do not report measures involving the 1st and 99th percentiles because the estimates were too noisy to 
be included. Noise in the percentile estimates is worsened by the fact that most estimates in the table 
involve comparing distributions (actual vs counterfactual and/or changes over time), and so the figures are 
differences not levels (unlike in Figure 2). Following LMP (2009) we smoothed the intermediate 
percentiles using a moving average of +/-2 percentiles (the unsmoothed estimates show a very similar 
pattern). 
9 The measures of actual dispersion are the same in each panel but are replicated for ease of comparison 
with the counterfactual measures.  
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instance, broad PP contributed to greater wage variance as measured by the 95-50 gap in 
both 1998-2000 (0.11 log points) and 2006-08 (0.15 log points).  In contrast, broad PP 
actually closed the 50-5 gap in 1998-2000 (by 0.02 log points), only to see a wage dispersing 
effect emerge in 2006-08 (of 0.02 log points).  
 
The picture looks very different in relation to narrow PP in the bottom panel of the table.  
Although narrow PP is associated with higher wage dispersion in both periods, the size of 
this disequalising effect fell over the period, especially at the top (so as to close the 95-50 gap 
by 0.03 log points).  The only part of the distribution where the disequalising effect grew was 
near the bottom, and this effect is quantitatively small (widening the 50-5 gap by 0.01 log 
points).  
 
These divergent results for broad and narrow PP highlight the value in distinguishing 
between various types of PP when evaluating its impact on wages and wage dispersion.  The 
results here confirm the importance of bonus payments in particular in understanding PP 
effects on growing wage dispersion among men. One possible reason why bonuses are 
particularly important in affecting wage dispersion is that bonuses are particularly prevalent 
at the top of the wage distribution and, as other research using the BHPS has shown, among 
men bonuses tend to substitute for fixed pay at the bottom of the wage distribution but this 
substitution effect is not apparent at the top of the distribution (Green and Heywood, 
2012).10 
10 Close to two-fifths of male employees received bonuses during this period.  BHPS also asks "What was 
the total amount of bonus you received over the last twelve months?"  For those receiving a bonus they 
were the equivalent of around about 3.5% of base pay in the late 1990s, rising to 4.5-5% towards the end of 
our period of investigation. 
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Table 7 – Effect of PP jobs on log wage distribution (men), 1998-2000 and 2006-2008 
































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Broad PP measure         
Variance 0.304 0.281 0.023 0.344 0.295 0.048 0.039 0.025 64.3 
Percentile gaps         
90-10 1.373 1.308 0.065 1.389 1.306 0.083 0.016 0.018 110.6 
95-50 0.981 0.874 0.106 1.006 0.853 0.153 0.025 0.047 186.8 
90-50 0.761 0.688 0.074 0.760 0.681 0.080 -0.001 0.006 -724.4 
50-10 0.612 0.620 -0.008 0.629 0.625 0.004 0.017 0.012 69.9 
50-5 0.790 0.812 -0.022 0.844 0.826 0.018 0.054 0.040 73.9 
Narrow PP measure         
Variance 0.304 0.287 0.017 0.344 0.334 0.010 0.039 -0.007 -17.6 
Percentile gaps         
90-10 1.373 1.324 0.048 1.389 1.365 0.025 0.016 -0.024 -145.8 
95-50 0.981 0.927 0.054 1.006 0.980 0.025 0.025 -0.029 -115.4 
90-50 0.761 0.721 0.040 0.760 0.735 0.026 -0.001 -0.015 1777.0 
50-10 0.612 0.604 0.008 0.629 0.630 -0.001 0.017 -0.009 -52.1 





While Table 7 presents estimates of the size of PP effects on wage dispersion among men at 
specific points of the wage distribution, we can also illustrate the distributional effects using 
graphs. Figures 3a and 3b present the effects of broad PP over the wage distribution for 
men. The solid line in Figure 3a represents the difference broad PP made to log hourly wage 
dispersion in the period 2006-08 by comparing the actual log hourly wages of all male 
employees - who are a mixture of PP and FP workers - with counterfactual wages based on a 
scenario in which nobody receives PP (the corresponding summary measures are in the top 
panel of Table 7 in column 3). The counterfactual gap is fairly flat in the bottom half of the 
wage distribution, but then it begins to rise such that the log wage differential is around .15 
log points towards the top of the wage distribution.   
 
The dotted line presents the same information but for the period 2006-2008 (corresponding 
to column 6 in the top panel of Table 7).  The effect of PP is more pronounced in the later 
period, rising much more steeply in the top half of the wage distribution. Consistent with the 
summary measures reported above, the graphs indicate that PP has a disequalising effect on 
wages which increased in the later period.  
 


















0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentile
Effect of PP jobs (broad) 1998-2000
Effect of PP jobs (broad) 2006-2008
Smoothed by Locally Weighted Regression
Men




Figure 3b - Effect of PP jobs (broad measure) on change in wage distribution 
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Figure 3b shows the role played by broad PP in the change in the male wage distribution 
between the early and late periods.  The sold line shows how the male wage distribution 
actually changed (corresponding to column 7 in the top panel in  Table 7), while the dotted 
line shows how the male wage distribution would have changed in the absence of PP (that is,  
the difference in the counterfactual scenarios for 1998-2000 and 2006-08). Thus the gap 
between the two lines gives the effect of PP on changes in the distribution (corresponding to 
column 8 in the upper panel of Table 7). PP makes little difference to the change in the wage 
distribution in the lower half of the wage distribution: wage dispersion grew in the lowest 
quartile of the distribution, and would have done in a similar fashion in the absence of PP. 
We noted above that PP widened the 50-5 gap (relative to the counterfactual without PP 
jobs) but it is clear from the graph that most of the change was due to a small rise in the 
median (the solid line is higher than the dotted one) and not a fall in the 5th percentile. This 
illustrates how the graph can provide a more complete picture than just comparing two 
points alone.   
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In contrast, the graph confirms the figures in Table 7 showing broad PP contributed to 
rising earnings dispersion in the top half of the wage distribution: in the absence of PP the 
wage growth in the upper part of the distribution would have been about half of what it 
actually was (an increase of about .10 log points compared with about .05 log points at the 
80th percentile, for example). In fact, what is striking from the graph is that wage dispersion 
would have actually fallen between roughly the median and the 80th percentile without PP 
jobs. Higher up (between about the 80th and 90th percentiles), dispersion would have 
increased to a small extent, but actual dispersion, reflecting the effect of PP jobs, increased 
much more.  
 
As indicated in Table 7, the picture looks rather different for men if we focus on the narrow 
measure of PP.  PP measured in this way does result in a wider wage dispersion than would 
be the case in its absence. Although this was the case both at the beginning and the end of 
our period of investigation, the effect was attenuated in the second period (Figure 4a). 
Consequently, the effect of narrow PP jobs on changes in the wage distribution over the 
period was actually to reduce that dispersion, though not by very much (Figure 4b).11 
 
11 As noted earlier, close to two-fifths of male employees received bonuses during this period.  BHPS also 
asks "What was the total amount of bonus you received over the last twelve months?"  For those receiving a 
bonus they were the equivalent of around about 3.5% of base pay in the late 1990s, rising to 4.5-5% 
towards the end of our period of investigation. 
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Figure 4b - Effect of PP jobs (narrow measure) on change in wage distribution 
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Table 8 – Effect of PP jobs on log wage distribution (women), 1998-2000 and 2006-2008 
































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Broad PP measure         
Variance 0.280 0.296 -0.016 0.291 0.294 -0.004 0.011 0.013 118.7 
Percentile gaps         
90-10 1.293 1.316 -0.023 1.306 1.328 -0.021 0.013 0.001 10.5 
95-50 0.917 0.918 -0.001 0.959 0.926 0.034 0.042 0.034 80.8 
90-50 0.712 0.711 0.001 0.764 0.755 0.009 0.052 0.008 14.9 
50-10 0.582 0.606 -0.024 0.542 0.573 -0.030 -0.039 -0.006 16.3 
50-5 0.772 0.806 -0.034 0.752 0.813 -0.061 -0.021 -0.028 133.8 
Narrow PP measure         
Variance 0.280 0.285 -0.005 0.291 0.284 0.007 0.011 0.012 113.5 
Percentile gaps         
90-10 1.293 1.305 -0.012 1.306 1.291 0.016 0.013 0.028 211.5 
95-50 0.917 0.907 0.010 0.959 0.933 0.026 0.042 0.016 38.6 
90-50 0.712 0.710 0.002 0.764 0.743 0.021 0.052 0.019 35.8 
50-10 0.582 0.595 -0.014 0.542 0.547 -0.005 -0.039 0.009 -22.6 




Now we turn to wage dispersion among women.  It is apparent from column 7 in Table 8 
that overall wage dispersion among women grew over the period, but only very marginally 
(variance increased by 0.011).  This is partly because trends went in opposite directions in the 
top and bottom halves of the wage distribution: wages became more compressed in the 
bottom half of the wage distribution, whereas they became more dispersed in the top half of 
the distribution.  How did PP affect this distribution? 
 
If we begin with the broad PP measure, it is apparent that it tended to compress women's 
earnings at the bottom of the distribution in both periods (column 3 for 1998-2000 and 
column 6 for 2006-2008). This compressing effect became more apparent in the second 
period. There was little effect at the top of the distribution in 1998-2000 (column 3) but 
some widening in 2006-2008 (column 8).  
 
The overall effects of these counterveiling effects of the broad measure of PP on women's 
wages is best illustrated graphically. Figure 5a indicates that the broad measure of PP resulted 
in a wage distribution for women that was more U-shaped than it would have been in its 
absence. However, the U was flatter further up the wage distribution in the second period 
relative to the first.  This is why PP contributed to a growth in wage dispersion in the top 
half of the wage distribution compared with a counterfactual world without PP (compare the 
solid line with the dotted line in Figure 5b). This pattern of results is similar for women 
when using the narrow measure of PP jobs (Figures 6a and 6b). 
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Figure 5a - Effect of PP jobs (broad measure) on wage distribution in 1998-2000 and 
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Figure 5b - Effect of PP jobs (broad measure) on change in wage distribution 
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Figure 6a - Effect of PP jobs (narrow measure) on wage distribution in 1998-2000 and 














0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentile
Effect of PP jobs (narrow) 1998-2000
Effect of PP jobs (narrow) 2006-2008
Smoothed by Locally Weighted Regression
Women




Figure 6b - Effect of PP jobs (narrow measure) on change in wage distribution 
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Table 9 – Effect of PP jobs on log wage distribution (Full-time women), 1998-2000 and 2006-2008 
































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Broad PP measure         
Variance 0.252 0.257 -0.005 0.274 0.286 -0.012 0.022 -0.007 -31.2 
Percentile gaps         
90-10 1.263 1.282 -0.019 1.277 1.290 -0.013 0.014 0.006 40.0 
95-50 0.849 0.803 0.046 0.907 0.861 0.046 0.058 0.001 1.0 
90-50 0.660 0.630 0.030 0.713 0.677 0.036 0.053 0.006 11.9 
50-10 0.603 0.652 -0.049 0.564 0.613 -0.049 -0.040 -0.001 2.1 
50-5 0.778 0.832 -0.055 0.766 0.873 -0.107 -0.011 -0.052 466.0 
Narrow PP measure         
Variance 0.252 0.255 -0.002 0.274 0.273 0.001 0.022 0.003 15.3 
Percentile gaps         
90-10 1.263 1.266 -0.003 1.277 1.257 0.019 0.014 0.022 160.8 
95-50 0.849 0.825 0.024 0.907 0.873 0.034 0.058 0.010 17.2 
90-50 0.660 0.641 0.019 0.713 0.669 0.044 0.053 0.025 47.7 
50-10 0.603 0.625 -0.021 0.564 0.588 -0.025 -0.040 -0.003 8.1 





Finally we turn to women in full-time employment.  Their wages became more dispersed 
over the period, the effect being more pronounced than for all women (variance rose by 
0.02, Table 9, column 7, compared with 0.01 for all women, Table 8, column 7). However, as 
in the case of all women, there was compression in earnings at the bottom of the distribution 
and growing earnings dispersion at the top of the distribution. The growth in dispersion in 
the top half of the distribution is actually quite substantial: the 95-50 ratio grows by 0.06 log 
points. 
 
Turning to the effects of PP on the dispersion of full-time women's earnings and focusing 
first on the broad PP measure  it is apparent that PP is associated with greater wage 
dispersion at the top of the distribution but lower dispersion at the bottom of the 
distribution.  This is the case in both 1998-2000 and 2006-2008 (upper panel Table 9, 
columns 3 and 6).  These effects change very little over the whole period, with the exception 
of the compressing effect of broad PP on the 50-5 differential, which almost doubles.   
 
Looking at the whole distribution graphically using the broad PP measure the PP effect on 
full-time womens' earnings relative to a counterfactual world without PP is highest at the top 
and bottom of the earnings distribution, forming the U-shape referred to above for all 
women.  The size of this effect is larger in the second period (2006-2008) relative to the early 
period (1998-2000) but it is similar across all the distribution, except at the very top (Figure 
7a). For this reason PP (broadly defined) resulted in higher earnings among full-time 
working women, but it had little effect on changing inequality (which decreased below the 
10th percentile and increased above the median), except perhaps to mitigate the increase at 
the very top (Figure 7b). 
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Figure 7a - Effect of PP jobs (broad measure) on wage distribution in 1998-2000 and 
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Figure 7b - Effect of PP jobs (broad measure) on change in wage distribution 
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If we turn to the narrow PP measure and consider its effects on the log hourly earnings of 
women working full-time this is a shallow U-shape, in both periods, but the size of the effect 
is greater in 2006-08 (Figure 8a) such that PP increases wage dispersion over the period, as 
indicated by the rising solid line in Figure 8b relative to the dotted line for the counterfactual 
"no PP" world, once one moves beyond the lowest quartile of the earnings distribution.   
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Figure 8a - Effect of PP jobs (narrow measure) on wage distribution in 1998-2000 and 
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Figure 8b - Effect of PP jobs (narrow measure) on change in wage distribution 
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5. Conclusions
There has been much speculation about the various causes of growing wage dispersion in 
Britain, the United States and elsewhere.  The seminal paper by LMP (2009) showed PP 
contributed significantly to the growth in earnings dispersion in the United States through to 
the early 1990s.  Using data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) we adopt a 
similar estimation approach to LMP but applied to Britain during the decade of economic 
growth that ended abruptly with the recession of 2008. In contrast to LMP, we find that 
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rather than increasing, the prevalence of PP declined (or at most stayed flat) over the decade 
to 2008. This applies to both broad and narrow measures of PP (although there is some 
evidence that bonus payments increased), and the trends appear comparable with more 
recent declines in the US identified by Gittleman. and Pierce (2013).  
We confirm others' findings that wage inequality grew overall during the decade to 2008, 
largely due to growing earnings dispersion in the top half of the wage distribution, but there 
was also some reduction of inequality among women in the bottom of the distribution. The 
contribution of PP to these changes depends on how the incidence and returns to PP 
changed and where workers sit in the wage distribution. While the incidence of PP fell, there 
was still a substantial wage return to PP and indeed it appears to have increased over time. 
Comparing the actual wage distribution with a counterfactual world without PP, we find the 
net effect of these changes to be that PP is associated with greater wage dispersion towards 
the top and, particularly for broad PP, that this disequalising effect increased over the period, 
possibly because of increased bonuses. This was accompanied by some counterveiling effects 
at the bottom, in particular broad PP is associated with more compressed wages in the lower 
half of the distribution for women. 
Overall PP contributed to earnings dispersion for both men and women in the upper half of 
the distribution although most of the growth was attributable to a particular type of PP 
namely bonuses. PP also explains some of the reduction in inequality among women in the 
lower half of the wage distribution. However, the size of these PP effects is relatively 
modest, perhaps in part because, in contrast to LMP, there is no indication that PP jobs 
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